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Nonstandard Work Arrangements 
in France and the United States
Institutional Contexts, Labor Market 
Conditions, and Patterns of Use
Françoise Carré
University of Massachusetts–Boston
Over the past 25 years, nonstandard work arrangements have
become a notable feature of labor markets in France and the United
States. This chapter compares patterns of nonstandard work in the two
countries and examines explanations for the growth of these arrange-
ments. Differences in institutional and macroeconomic contexts in
France and the United States are fruitful areas for exploring the factors
that shape nonstandard arrangements and their implications for work-
ers and policy.
The two countries invite a comparison because of shared experi-
ences as well as differences. They both have experienced the growth of
nonstandard arrangements. Also, both have witnessed an increase in
female labor market activity, particularly that of mothers with young
children. In contrast, the two countries differ in their institutional set-
tings of employment relationships and social protection policies, as
well as in policy on nonstandard work arrangements. Also, the coun-
tries differ in their macroeconomic experiences over the past 15 years.
France experienced little or no aggregate job growth and high levels of
unemployment, while the United States experienced comparatively
high job growth and low unemployment. The average unemployment
rate between 1986 and 1996 was 10.6 percent in France and 6.2 percent
in the United States (OECD 1999). Unemployment in both countries is
unevenly distributed across age and race/ethnicity. Gender differences
in unemployment are greater in France than in the United States. Thus,
a comparison of nonstandard arrangements in these two settings should
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enable us to examine how patterns of use, workforce characteristics,
and implications for workers are affected by conditions of labor
demand and by the institutional setting.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section outlines differ-
ences in context across the two countries. We then review trends in
short-term, temporary agency, and part-time employment, followed by
implications for workers. The final section reviews explanations for
trends and their implications. We review workforce characteristics and
preferences, as well as employer motivations and the role of each coun-
try’s institutional context in shaping these.
CONTEXTS
Different Macroeconomic Contexts
In France, low job growth and high unemployment in the 1980s
and 1990s has meant particularly high unemployment rates for young
workers and higher unemployment rates for women than for men. The
male unemployment rate was 7 percent in 1990 and 10 percent in 1998,
and the female rate was 12 percent in 1990 and 14 percent in 1998. The
corresponding U.S. figures were 6 percent in 1990 and 5 percent in
1998 for men as well as women.1 In France, employment rates
(employment to population ratio) were lower overall than in the United
States: 60 percent in 1990 and 59 percent in 1998, compared with 72
percent and 74 percent, respectively, in the United States (OECD 1999,
p. 225). Employment rates in France, however, were much lower for
younger workers (age 15 or 16 to age 24) and older workers (ages 55 to
64). For example, in 1998, the employment rate for young workers was
21 percent in France and 59 percent in the United States. The same
year, the employment rate for older workers was 33 percent in France
and 58 percent in the United States (OECD 1999, pp. 228–230).
Different Institutional Contexts
On the face of it, the two countries have strikingly different institu-
tional employment contexts. The common law contract for standard
employment in France is a contract of indeterminate duration (Contrat
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à Durée Indéterminée, CDI); the Labor Code states that a contract of
employment is “made without limit of time.” This is a standard shared
with other Western European countries. Nonstandard employment con-
tracts are defined in contrast to this contract of indeterminate duration.
The package of worker rights and benefits in France has been con-
structed over time around the norm of the CDI. A worker under a CDI
is entitled to socially provided benefits, the right to organize and bar-
gain, and specific conditions governing discharge and layoffs. Thus,
the growth of nonstandard employment has warranted close policy
attention because workers in these arrangements initially stood in a
regulatory vacuum. This situation was remedied with legislation gov-
erning specific nonstandard contracts during the 1970s and 1980s.
In contrast, the U.S. common law standard for employment is
“employment-at-will,” meaning that dismissal is at the employer’s
will. There are no due process or “just cause” restrictions on dis-
charges. In addition, the extent of government involvement in setting
terms of employment is less extensive than in France. One should not
equate legal standards with practice, however. In the United States,
employment conditions have also been shaped by personnel policies of
large employers and by collective bargaining agreements in the union-
ized sector. In these settings, the employment-at-will standard has been
tempered with due process clauses on discharge and other policies
meant to imply some attachment between worker and employer. In
addition, several grounds for exception to the employment-at-will legal
standard have been upheld in court decisions.
Therefore, policy and practice have resulted in basic employment
terms in the two countries that are more comparable than the respective
legal standard in each country would suggest. This is particularly true
for workers in firms with internal labor markets, most often large com-
panies, but often medium-sized ones as well. Nevertheless, there
remain significant differences in terms of employment and institutional
settings between the two countries. Most salient, France relies on more
formal, explicit, and specific employment regulation than the United
States. France also provides key social protection benefits through
national systems for health and national or industry-wide pension cov-
erage. In contrast, the United States relies on tax deductible, employer-
sponsored health plans and pension plans (providing retirement income
that is expected to complement the federal Social Security minimum);
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most of these plans generate benefits that are rarely portable and, when
they are, only under specific conditions.
Other elements of the French institutional setting, to which we will
return later, are in seeming contrast with the United States and have
bearing on use of nonstandard work arrangements. First, during the
1970s, France implemented administrative oversight of economic lay-
offs, a policy that was revoked in 1986. The U.S. layoff notification
legislation enacted in 1988 (WARN Act)2 is less restrictive. Second,
beginning in the early 1980s, France explicitly regulated nonstandard
work arrangements. Key to this discussion is that, since 1982, France
has mandated wage and benefit parity between workers in nonstandard
work arrangements and those with regular arrangements in the same
jobs, whereas the United States has not.
The different macroeconomic and institutional contexts in France
and the United States have several implications, which will be
addressed in this chapter. On the one hand, the different contexts may
be the source of the differing patterns of nonstandard work arrange-
ments in the two countries. On the other hand, the different contexts
shape the implications of nonstandard work arrangements for workers
and, to some extent, their degree of choice and satisfaction. The weak
employment picture in France has meant that nonstandard work
arrangements are mainly studied and understood in terms of their rela-
tion to unemployment and underemployment and, more generally, to
employment flux. Nonstandard work arrangements tend to be seen as a
way station to regular employment, particularly for young workers and
women. In contrast, in the United States, nonstandard work arrange-
ments have been examined mainly in terms of their relation to wages
and benefits.
TRENDS AND WORKERS AFFECTED
Two main categories of nonstandard work arrangements can be
compared: short-term, or fixed-term arrangements, and employment
arranged through a temporary work agency. Short-term arrangements
seem to be more common in France than in the United States. In both
countries, women are more affected than men. Temporary agency help,
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or “temp” employment, is more common in France and displays a dif-
ferent industrial distribution of user firms than in the United States.
French temporary employment is concentrated in manufacturing and
construction, which results in a much higher representation of men in
temporary employment in France than in the United States.
Definitions for nonstandard work arrangements differ somewhat
across the two countries. Therefore, comparisons of aggregated catego-
ries are not possible. Fixed-term employment in France is a specific
employment contract of “determinate duration” (Contrat à Durée
Déterminée, or CDD); these are employment contracts that must
explicitly state a duration of employment. In the United States, short-
term arrangements entail cases where workers are hired directly by
firms to work for a specified period of time. Direct hire temporary
work is a category estimated rather than directly reported in federal sta-
tistics (see below). On-call workers, defined as those who work only
on an as-needed basis, are compared here with the French category of
fixed-term contracts. Temporary agency work, an assignment through
an intermediary temp/staffing service or agency, is categorized as a
separate “employment status” with a specific “temp contract” (Contrat
d’Interim) in France. In the United States, temporary agency employ-
ment is documented by a specific category in federal statistics.
Throughout this chapter, we refer to temporary agency workers as
“temp contracts” or “temps.” 
Short-Term Employment in France and the United States
Fixed-term employment (CDD) in France is slightly greater than
direct-hire temporaries and on-call workers combined in the United
States. According to the French annual national labor force survey, the
share of CDDs in private wage and salary employment has grown
steadily, from 2.2 percent in 1982 to 6.1 percent in 1999 (INSEE 1982–
1999).3 In the United States, data on nonstandard work arrangements
have only been recorded systematically since 1995, in the Alternative
Employment Arrangements Supplement to the February Current Popu-
lation (household) Survey (CPS).4 On-call workers represented 1.5 per-
cent of U.S. employment in 1999 (2,180,000 workers), a slight
decrease from 1.7 percent in 1995 (Table 5.1). Direct hire temporaries
were estimated at 2.1 to 2.7 percent of employment in the 1995 CPS
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Table 5.1 Percentage of Workers with Alternative Employment 
Arrangements, United States
1995 1997 1999
Independent contractors 6.7 6.7 6.3
On-call workers 1.7 1.6 1.5






Total 9.9 9.9 9.3
Distribution of workers with alternative arrangements by gender
Men Women Men Women Men Women
% of independent 
contractors
67.3 32.7 66.6 33.4 66.2 33.8
On-call workers: 48.4 51.6 49.0 51.0 48.8 51.2
Temporary help agency
workers:
47.2 52.8 44.7 55.3 42.2 57.8
Workers provided by 
contract firms
71.5 28.5 69.8 30.2 70.5 29.5
Workers with traditional 
arrangements:
52.8 47.2 52.7 47.3 52.4 47.6
Male and female workers with alternative arrangements
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Independent contractors 8.4 4.8 8.3 4.8 7.8 4.5
On-call workers 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.7
Temporary help agency 
workers
0.8 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.7 1.1
Workers provided by 
contract firms
0.7 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4
Workers with traditional 
arrangements
88.5 92.0 88.6 91.9 89.2 92.2
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years.
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(Houseman and Polivka 2000)5 and 2.6 percent in the 1997 survey
(Houseman 1999).
These types of short-term arrangements concentrate in both coun-
tries in similar industries (services, trade, and construction), with one
exception; in France, the incidence of CDDs is particularly high in
manufacturing (food processing and consumer goods manufacturing)
(Table 5.2). These industry patterns are mirrored in the occupational
concentrations of short-term employment in the two countries. From
1982 to 1999, the incidence of CDDs increased across all major occu-
pation groups in France (Table 5.3). It is particularly high for the
“employees” category, which includes office clerical, retail clerks, and
direct service workers. In the United States as well, direct hires cluster
in administrative support and services (Houseman 1999, Hudson
1999). A major difference is that, in France, the incidence of CDDs is
also high for manual workers, while in the United States, professionals
account for one cluster of on-call workers.
Evidence from the United States indicates distinct gender and race/
ethnicity occupational patterns. Female on-call workers cluster in ele-
mentary and secondary schools, hospitals, and restaurant and bar ser-
vices, while male on-call workers cluster in construction. The most
common occupation for Hispanic male on-call workers is farm worker,
while for white males, it is truck driver. For Hispanic females, the most
common on-call occupation is domestic worker in a private household,
while for white females, it is elementary school teacher (Hudson
1999).
In France, women are overrepresented in the CDD workforce rela-
tive to their share in the total workforce (Table 5.4). For example, in
1989, women accounted for 49.8 percent of CDDs and 38.9 percent of
total employment. Although men accounted for the majority of work-
ers on CDDs through the 1980s, they were underrepresented relative to
their share of the total workforce. In 1989, men accounted for 50.2 per-
cent of CDDs but 61.1 percent of the workforce. When the entire
period 1982–1999 is considered, however, men’s share of CDDs and of
total private employment both decline so that, by 1999, women are the
majority of CDDs (53.1 percent). The incidence of CDDs among
employed women rose steadily throughout the period, while for men,
albeit consistently lower, it increased as well. Thus, over the past two
decades, as the incidence of CDDs increased overall in the economy,
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Table 5.2 Incidence and Distribution of CDDsa (Fixed-Term Contracts), 
by Industry, France
Incidenceb Distributionc
CDD – Both sexes 1982 1989 1999 1982 1989 1999
Unspecified sector 4.13 8.17 17.59 1.28 0.91 0.11
Agriculture 3.88 8.00 14.75 4.03 3.45 4.59
Manufacturing
Food processing 3.26 5.27 6.54 5.43 4.46 4.10
Energy 0.70 0.84 0.93 0.59 0.34 0.21
Intermediate goods mfg. 1.57 4.15 3.88 7.20 8.23 6.25
Production goods mfg. 1.55 3.85 3.86 8.98 9.34 3.35
Consumer goods mfg. 2.34 5.14 5.79 9.93 9.46 4.66
Automotive industry — — 2.59 — — 0.84
ALL MANUFACTURING 1.87 4.25 4.35 32.13 31.83 19.42
Construction and public works 2.57 3.57 4.73 11.88 7.60 5.75
Trade 2.55 5.14 6.00 16.41 16.92 16.60
Transportation and 
communications
1.20 3.05 6.03 3.05 3.92 5.82
Market services 2.98 5.67 22.72 25.63




Financial institutions 0.99 3.31 2.04 3.61
Financial activities 3.54 2.66
Real estate activities 4.71 1.12
Nonmarket services 2.22 4.37 6.46 6.14
Education, health, social services 9.29 12.49
Administration 9.05 4.33
Tertiary sector 2.35 4.85 6.68 50.68 56.22 70.14
ALL ACTIVITIES OR TOTAL 2.24 4.60 6.08 100 100 100
a CDD = Contrat à Durée Déterminée (contract of determinate duration).
b Figures represent the percentage of workers within the industry in CDDs.
c Figures represent the percentage of all CDD workers in the particular industry.
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA09.
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and as women’s share of total employment increased, CDDs dispropor-
tionately affected women workers, and CDDs had come to represent a
significant share of female employment by the turn of the century. In
the United States as well, women are overrepresented among on-call
workers relative to their share of the workforce. They are also overrep-
resented among direct hire temporaries (Houseman 1999).
Temporary Help Employment
In both countries, temporary employment has two “poles” of activ-
ity: manual labor in manufacturing or construction and clerical and
administrative support in trade and services (broadly defined). How-
ever, the incidence of temporary work is from two to three times
greater in France than in the United States, depending on definitions
used. Manual labor assignments in manufacturing and construction
have come to dominate temporary employment in France and, as such,
it has become an overwhelmingly male work arrangement. This situa-
tion differs dramatically from that in the United States, where female
workers, while in declining preponderance over time, continue to pre-
dominate in temporary employment.
Table 5.3 CDDsa in Total Private Wage and Salary Employment, by 
Major Occupation, France (%)
Incidence Distribution
1982 1989 1999 1982 1989 1999
Executive and intellectual 
professions
1.39 2.26 3.84 4.81 4.77 7.83
Middle-level occupations 1.63 3.25 4.63 13.01 13.83 15.82
Employees 2.68 5.40 7.79 32.45 32.95 38.03
Manual workers 2.35 5.21 6.26 49.74 48.45 38.32
Total 2.24 4.60 6.08 100 100 100
NOTE: This table includes workers in nationalized companies. Public-sector workers
are excluded, as are artisans and business owners (CDDs do not apply to them).
“Employees” include clerical, retail clerks, and direct service workers. 
a CDD = Contrat à Durée Déterminée (contract of determinate duration).
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA05.
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In France, temporary employment tripled, from 0.9 percent of pri-
vate wage and salary employment in 1982 to 3 percent in 1999, and it
grew particularly rapidly during the 1990s (Table 5.5). In the United
States, temporary help workers accounted for about 1 percent of
employment from 1995 to 1999 according to the CPS. Although tem-
porary workers are overwhelmingly white, the incidence of temporary
employment is twice as high among black workers (2 percent) and
slightly higher for Hispanics (1.4 percent) (Houseman 1999, Hudson
1999). The U.S. temporary help service industry has also been tracked
with national time series data. Although these data are not comparable
to household data (the number of jobs is greater than the number of
workers), they provide useful trend information. From 1986 to 1996,
temporary help service employment grew from 0.5 percent to 1.9 per-
Table 5.4 Incidence of CDDsa (Fixed-Term Contracts) and Agency 
Temporary Help Contracts, by Gender in Private 
Employment, France
1982 1989 1999
Total private employment 13,335,750 13,299,435 14,683,276
Male (%) 63.2 61.1 57.9
Female (%) 36.8 38.9 42.1
CDD in all sectors 298,391 611,137 892,207
Male (%) 55.3 50.2 46.9
Female (%) 44.7 49.8 53.1
Temporary help in all sectors 124,651 233,719 446,959
Male (%) 61.2 70.0 71.5
Female (%) 38.8 30.0 28.5
Share of total CDD (%) 2.2 4.6 6.1
Share of employed males (%) 2.0 3.8 4.9
Share of employed females (%) 2.7 5.9 7.7
Share of total temporary help (%) 0.9 1.8 3.0
Share of employed males (%) 0.9 2.0 3.8
Share of employed females (%) 1.0 1.4 2.1
NOTE: Temporary and CDD employment affect private wage and salary employment
only. 
a CDD = Contrat à Durée Déterminée (contract of determinate duration).
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA09.
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cent of employment. For comparison, over the same period, estimates
derived from the CPS indicate growth from 0.5 percent to 0.8 percent
of employment (Blank 1998).6
In France, between 1982 and 1989, the sectors that rely relatively
heavily on temporary help are manufacturing (particularly production
goods and intermediate goods) and construction and public works
(Table 5.5).7 In the United States, temporary workers cluster in ser-
Table 5.5 Incidence and Distribution of Agency Temps, by Industry, 
France
Incidencea Distributionb
1982 1989 1999c 1982 1989 1999c
Unspecified sector 3.73 0.85 — 2.77 0.25 —
Agriculture 0.00 0.24 — 0.00 0.27 —
Manufacturing
Food processing 0.82 2.69 — 3.25 5.97 —
Energy 1.18 1.75 — 2.36 1.84 —
Intermediate goods mfg. 0.95 3.14 — 10.49 16.29 —
Production goods mfg. 1.64 3.37 — 22.75 21.37 —
Consumer goods mfg. 0.59 1.56 — 5.96 7.49 —
ALL MANUFACTURING 1.09 2.70 — 44.81 52.95 —
Construction and public works 1.07 2.39 — 11.84 13.30 —
Trade 0.57 0.55 — 8.84 4.70 —
Transportation and 
communications 0.47 1.25 — 2.83 4.20 —
Market services 1.35 1.78 — 24.57 20.99 —
Services to business — — 21.28 — — 100
Financial institutions 0.34 0.93 — 1.68 2.64 —
Nonmarket services 0.38 0.19 — 2.67 0.71 —
Tertiary sector 0.79 1.10 4.77 40.59 33.23 100
ALL ACTIVITIES OR TOTAL 0.93 1.76 3.04 100 100 100
a Figures represent the percentage of workers within the industry who are agency tem-
poraries.
b Figures represent the percentage of all agency temporaries who are in that particular
industry.
c Starting in 1990, all temp employment is reported under “Market Services.”
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA09.
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vices, trade, and manufacturing, but in the latter sector to a lesser
degree than in France. However, manufacturing assignments have been
growing in recent years. There is also a distinct gender pattern to indus-
trial concentration.8
From 1982 to 1989, the incidence of temporary contracts in France
grew for all major occupation groups except executives, for whom it
declined (Table 5.6). The group with the highest incidence of tempo-
rary employment is manual workers (6.6 percent in 1999); it accounted
for 81.8 percent of temporary workers in 1999. In the United States,
temporary workers cluster in administrative support and operator (fab-
ricators, laborers) occupations. Female workers cluster in secretarial,
nursing, data entry, and office clerks, while males cluster in assembly
and laborers outside of construction. Occupational characteristics vary
across racial and ethnic groups. For example, the most common occu-
pation for black women in temporary positions is a secretary and for
Hispanic women, it is a nursing aide (Hudson 1999).9
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, temporary employment
remained a male phenomenon in France (Table 5.4). Men began the
Table 5.6 Incidence and Distribution of Agency Temps in Total Private 
Wage and Salary Employment, by Major Occupation, Francea
Incidenceb Distributionc
1982 1989 1999 1982 1989 1999
Executive and intellectual 
professionals
0.34 0.16 0.24 2.80 0.91 0.98
Middle level occupations 0.56 0.68 0.88 10.76 7.55 6.01
Employees 1.05 1.09 1.26 30.39 17.46 12.26
Manual workers 1.11 3.05 6.61 56.05 74.08 80.75
TOTAL 0.93 1.76 3.04 100 100 100
a This table includes workers in nationalized companies. Public-sector workers are
excluded, as are artisans and business owners (CDDs do not apply to them).
“Employees” include clerical, retail clerks, and direct service workers.
b Figures represent the percentage of workers within the occupational category who are
agency temporaries.
c Figures represent percentage of all agency temps in the occupational category.
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA05.
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period slightly underrepresented in temp employment relative to their
share of the workforce, but by the end of the period, they were overrep-
resented—71.5 percent in 1999. As temp employment grew, particu-
larly in the 1990s, and men’s share of total employment declined, temp
employment became an increasing factor in male employment. In con-
trast, although the incidence of temporary employment also grew
steadily for women over the period, their share of temp employment
declined steadily.
The shifting gender composition in temporary employment in both
countries points to the role that demand plays in the composition and
characteristics of the temp workforce. In France, temp workers were
not always predominantly male; women were the majority in 1962
(Huet and Schmitz 1984). They were slightly overrepresented in 1968,
accounting for 40 percent of the temp industry’s workforce compared
with 34 percent of the total wage and salary workforce. As unskilled
jobs in manufacturing fueled the temp industry’s growth, the female
share of employment declined, from 38 percent in1970 to 28 percent in
1981. Huet and Schmitz (1984) attribute this growing underrepresenta-
tion to the fact that three-fourths of women concentrate outside blue-
collar jobs and, when they are employed in manufacturing, they work
in sectors that are light users of temporary workers (Huet and Schmitz
1984, p. 45).10 The Enquête Emploi confirms the relative concentration
of temp assignments in manufacturing and construction during the
1980s as well.
In the United States, women were the majority of temp workers
prior to 1985 (Plewes 1988). Since then, the gender and occupational
compositions of industry employment have evolved, but women
remain the majority of temps. As the temporary agency industry grew
rapidly and steadily over the 1980s and 1990s, the share of clerical and
service occupations within it declined (and blue-collar occupations
grew), and with it, the prevalence of women workers declined as well.
The share of women in temporary employment declined from 76.7 per-
cent in 1984–1985 to 60.4 percent in 1994–1995, while the share of
clerical and service jobs in temporary employment declined from 59
percent in 1984–1985 to 45 percent in 1994–1995.11 Should the share
of blue-collar assignments continue to grow, it is possible that the gen-
der pattern may reverse. 
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In summary, the evolving characteristics of temp employment in
France and the United States point to the role of demand by user firms
and their industry distribution, and to the history and market strategy of
the temp industry in each country.
Other Forms of Alternative Work Arrangements 
Other nonstandard arrangements are not discussed here due to the
lack of readily comparable data across the two countries. United States
independent contractors are usually self-employed. French indepen-
dent workers, a broader group, account for 7.9 percent of private
employment (INSEE 1999).12 Contract company workers are employed
by a company that provides their services to other firms and usually are
on the worksite of the client.13 They are not a separate category in
French statistics. 
Part-Time Work
Because jobs with part-time hours are often associated with terms
of employment that are different from those for full-time work, they
warrant separate consideration. Part-time work has followed different
paths in the two countries. It expanded in the United States earlier than
in France and represented a higher share of employment for much of
the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1990s, however, its share of total
employment grew rapidly in France while it remained level in the
United States.
Comparable Data on France and the United States
Based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) definition of part-time work as fewer than 30 hours
per week, the gender difference in incidence is greater in France than in
the United States.14 In 1997, part-time work in France accounted for 5.9
percent of total male (wage and salary) employment and 25.2 percent
of total female employment. In the United States, it accounted for 8.3
percent of male and 19.5 percent of female employment (OECD 1999,
p. 39). The incidence of part-time work of fewer than 20 hours per
week (short part-time) is lower in France than in the United States. In
1997, it constituted 2 percent of male employment and 8.9 percent of
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female employment in France, and 3.5 percent and 8 percent of male
and female employment, respectively, in the United States (OECD
1999, p. 39).15
Over the past decade, the contexts for part-time work have con-
trasted sharply in the two countries. In France, the number of part-time
jobs grew, while full-time employment declined. Between 1987 and
1997, the change in total employment was 0.26 percent, the growth of
part-time work as percentage of total 1987 employment was 0.29 per-
cent, while the change in full-time employment was –0.03 percent.
During the same period in the United States, total employment grew by
1.42 percent; part-time employment growth was 0.12 percent, and full-
time growth was 1.30 percent (OECD 1999, p. 36).
National Data on Part-Time Work
To build a reliable time series from published INSEE data, we
define part-time work as at least 30 hours per week, yet considered
below the prevailing full-time norm in each workplace.16 Thus defined,
the incidence of part-time work in France has risen economy-wide
from 8.5 percent in 1982 to 18 percent in 1999. Further, it had risen in
all industrial sectors and occupations over the period (Table 5.7). (The
employment base includes private and public wage and salary work-
ers.)
In the United States, according to national statistics, part-time
work grew from 13 percent of nonagricultural employment in 1958 to
18 percent in 1989 (Tilly 1992, reporting from Employment and Earn-
ings, with part-time work defined as fewer than 35 hours per week).
Data from recent years are not strictly comparable to those of historical
trends owing to a survey change. In 1997, the share of the workforce in
part-time work was 17.8 percent (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt
1999). Regular part-time work—which corresponds to part-time jobs
less those with nonstandard arrangements—amounted to 13.6 percent
of employment in 1997 and 13.7 percent in 1995 (Hudson 1999).
In both countries, the incidence of part-time jobs is high in similar
industries and occupations. In France, incidence is particularly high in
trade (retail, wholesale) and market and nonmarket services (Table
5.7). In 1999, several subsectors had particularly high incidence: ser-
vices to household or individuals, education and other social services,
and real estate. In the United States, industries with high incidence of
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Table 5.7 Incidence and Distribution of Part-Time in Public and Private 
Wage and Salary Employment, by Industry, France
Incidencea Distributionb
1982 1989 1999 1999
Unspecified sector 11.6 28.5 34.8 0.1
Agriculture 15.5 13.8 16.5 1.3
Manufacturing
Food processing 4.7 7.4 11.6 1.8
Energy 1.9 3.2 6.3 0.4
Intermediate goods mfg. 2.0 3.0 4.4 1.7
Production goods mfg. 1.6 3.2 5.4 1.2
Consumer goods mfg. 4.8 6.6 8.2 1.7
Automotive industry 3.9 0.3
Total Manufacturing 2.8 5.1
Construction and public 
works
2.8 2.7 4.7 1.4
Trade 11.3 14.0 19.8 13.7
Transportation and 
communications
4.4 5.2 6.6 1.6
Market services 11.5 16.4




Financial institutions 7.3 9.1
Financial activities 13.8 2.6
Real estate activities 21.9 1.6
Nonmarket services 8.6 16.2




Tertiary sector 11.8 16.2 22.2 41.1
All activities 8.5 12.2 18.0 100.00
a Figures represent the percentage of workers within the industry working part-time.
b Figures represent the percentage of all part-time workers in the particular industry.
SOURCE: INSEE (1989–99), Table PA07.
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part-time work in 1997 were retail trade, services, and finance (includ-
ing insurance and real estate).17
Correspondingly, the occupational patterns are parallel. In France,
in 1999, part-time work clustered broadly in employees (e.g., clerical,
retail), and mid-level occupations (e.g., paraprofessionals, technicians,
and forepersons) (Table 5.8).18 In the United States, part-time work is
clustered in occupations such as cashiers, waitresses, secretaries,
nurses, and sales clerks for women, and cooks, cashiers, stock han-
dlers, janitors, and truck drivers for men (Hudson 1999).
In both countries, women constitute the bulk of part-time workers,
a pattern consistent with the occupational distribution of these jobs.
This pattern holds in France even though part-time work has grown
faster among men in recent years. In France, part-time work has grown
from 17.8 percent of women’s wage and salary employment in 1982 to
31.7 percent in 1999. The corresponding figures for men are 2 percent
in 1982 and 5.5 percent in 1999 (Table 5.9). In the United States, in
1998, the incidence of part-time work was 28.6 percent for women and
11.4 percent for men (Employment and Earnings definition). Regular
Table 5.8 Incidence and Distribution of Part-Time, by Broad 




Farm operators 15.8 16.7 2.83
Artisans, shopkeepers, and 
business operators 7.8 8.1 3.25
Executives and intellectual 
professions 8.1 9.6 7.56
Middle-level occupations 10.1 13.7 16.81
Employeesd 26.2 31.8 53.52
Manual workers 8.1 10.8 16.01
Total 13.7 17.2 99.99
a This table includes all employment (wage employment and independents). 
b  Figures represent percentage of workers in the occupation who are part-time.
c  Figures represent the percentage of all part-time workers who are in the occupation.
d  “Employees” include clerical, retail clerks, and direct service workers.
SOURCE: INSEE (1989–99), Table PA03.
148 Carré
part-time work accounts for 21.3 percent of female employment and
6.9 percent of male employment (Hudson 1999). 
Recent French research points to clear distinctions by gender and
household characteristics. There are those who use it for “complemen-
tary” income, and those with limited time because they are female sin-
gle heads of households. A 1995 Enquête Emploi study of private-
sector part-time workers found that workers in couples in which one
partner works full-time have a part-time rate of 20 percent compared
with rates at or under 10 percent for those whose partner works part-
time, is unemployed, or is out of the labor force. The rate of part-time
work for single women is 20 percent and 24 percent for female heads
of households (Galtier 1999b, 1999c).
Part-time work in the United States varies notably by race and eth-
nicity. In 1997, the incidence of regular part-time work was lower for
non-Hispanic black women (15.7 percent) and for Hispanic women
(20.2 percent) than for white women (22.6 percent). It is, however,
slightly higher among black males (7.1 percent) and Hispanic males
(7.1 percent) than for white males (6.7 percent) (Hudson 1999).
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS
In both countries, there is an association between fixed-term and
temporary employment, on the one hand, and employment flux or
Table 5.9 Part-Time Work, by Gender, in Public and Private 
Employment, Francea
1982 1989 1999
Part-time in all sectors 1,515,535 2,241,015 3,935,529
Male total (%) 13.9 15.6 15.6
Female total (%) 86.1 84.4 84.4
Part-time share of total employed 8.5 11.7 17.2
Part-time share of employed males 2.0 3.4 5.5
Part-time share of employed 
females 17.8 23.6 31.7
a Self-reported; up to 30+ weekly hours.
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA07.
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instability and short part-time work hours, on the other. Instability is a
significant issue in France, while lack of access to benefits and differ-
ential treatment in pay are much greater issues in the United States.
Employment Flux
Fixed-term contracts (CDDs) have been strongly associated with
employment flux and with having a role in hiring and in unemploy-
ment (Audibert 1980; Audier 1985; Corbel, Guergoat, and Laulhé
1986; INSEE 1980; Voisin 1989). For example, from 1977 to 1985, the
share of CDDs among new unemployment claims rose from 19.1 per-
cent to 37.4 percent (Henriet 1988). Conversely, in a 1985 national sur-
vey, CDDs accounted for 64 percent of employment entries in firms of
50 or more workers and 46 percent of employment exits (Corbel, Guer-
goat, and Laulhé 1986).19 A later study reports that, in 1992, 67.5 per-
cent of those hired in establishments with 50 or more workers were for
CDDs (DARES 1993).
A study of registered unemployment insurance cases from 1993 to
1996 noted a growth in the incidence of intermittent employment (with
partial benefits) among the unemployed who were formerly working in
CDDs. The authors conclude that these workers expect difficulty in
their job search and are more willing to accept intermittent work during
the first four months of unemployment. They are likely to not use the
full duration of unemployment benefits to look for work (Granier and
Joutard 1999).20
Also, the French temp industry sees its mission primarily as facili-
tating access to (any) job and, secondarily, as meeting the needs of seg-
ments of the workforce for intermittent employment. Temp services do
not apply a penalty when a user firm recruits a temp worker. In some
sectors, the industry generates a recruiting pool for user firms.
In France, worker experience in part-time work during the 1990s
was colored by a climate of high unemployment. When part-time work
is not chosen (or “constrained,” that is, workers report wanting more
hours), it is more likely to be associated with short-term employment
(CDD, temp, or short-term internship). In the 1995 Enquête Emploi,
21.5 percent of women in constrained part-time jobs worked in a tem-
porary arrangement, compared with 8 percent of full-time women and
7 percent of women in “chosen part-time”; the corresponding numbers
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for men are 11 percent, 6.5 percent, and 37 percent, respectively (Galt-
ier 1999c).
Part-time work, particularly when constrained, appears to be asso-
ciated with flux in employment status and work arrangement. In a
cohort of part-time workers from 1994 to 1996, one-third of those in
constrained part-time work in 1994 (42 percent of all part-time work)
had not been in part-time work in 1993 (Galtier 1999a).21 By 1996, 37
percent of those in constrained part-time work in 1994 were in the
same situation; 25 percent worked full-time, 10 percent were unem-
ployed, 7 percent were out of the labor force, and 20 percent reported
working in “chosen” part-time jobs.22
In the United States, workers in nonstandard arrangements, except
independent contractors, also appear to experience more job instability
than regular full-time workers. Examining CPS data from 1995 to
1996, Houseman and Polivka (2000) found that on-call workers,
temps, direct hire temporaries, contract company workers, and regular
part-time workers were more likely to be with a different employer, be
unemployed, or be voluntarily out of the labor force one year later than
were regular full-time workers.23
Access to Benefits
Since the early 1980s, French law mandates parity of wage and
benefits between workers in CDD, temporary agency assignments, and
part-time arrangements, on the one hand, and regular workers holding
similar positions with equivalent skills, on the other. The parity of
socially provided health benefits, in particular, is comparatively easy to
implement. The context for parity enforcement is fairly strong. The
Ministry of Labor has a well-developed cadre of labor inspectors who
have strong powers of investigation, mediation, and enforcement.
Their investigative role is enhanced in workplaces with labor unions.
Nevertheless, parity is most easily enforced when workers are in virtu-
ally identical positions. Disparities in socially provided benefits are
possible in practice, particularly for part-time workers. Hour thresholds
for key benefits exclude workers with very short hours from benefits
(fewer than 507 hours in the previous 12 months, or fewer than 200
hours in the previous three months). Eligibility for old age insurance
(pension) is also based on hours and earnings. In addition, those hold-
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ing several part-time jobs are ineligible for unemployment insurance if
they lose one of these jobs (Gauvin 1988).
In the United States, there is a strong association between non-
standard arrangements and the lack of employer-sponsored benefits
(Hudson 1999; Kalleberg et al. 1997; Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson
2000). Access to employer-sponsored health insurance is particularly
low for temporary workers (8.5 percent) and on-call workers (21.1 per-
cent) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1999). Part-time jobs have a sim-
ilar liability; 18 percent of workers in regular part-time jobs have
insurance compared with 87 percent in regular full-time jobs (Hudson
1999). Eligibility to enroll in an employer-provided pension plan is
limited. In 1999, 11.8 percent of temp workers and 29 percent of on-
call workers were eligible to enroll compared with 54.1 percent of
workers in standard arrangements (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
1999). Similarly, 19 percent of regular part-time workers have
employer-provided pension coverage compared with 60 percent of reg-
ular full-time workers (Hudson 1999). Participation in employer-pro-
vided pension plans is lower still because workers must choose to
contribute a portion of their earnings: 5.8 percent of temp workers and
22.5 percent of on-call workers are included in their employer plan
compared with 48.3 percent of workers in standard arrangements (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000). Over time, this reduced access to
benefits may create difficulties for workers. Ferber and Waldfogel
(2000) find that past experience in part-time employment reduces the
probability of a worker having health insurance and pension coverage.
Wage Parity Issues 
Although in France, mandated wage parity is not always simple to
enforce, wage disparity has not been the subject of comprehensive
national research. In the United States, wage differentials have been
documented. On-call workers, temp workers, and direct hire temporar-
ies earn lower wages than workers in regular full-time arrangements.
This difference holds true even after controlling for worker and job
characteristics (industry, union status, occupation) (Houseman 1999,
using 1995 CPS results). Hudson (1999), using 1997 CPS data, finds
that, after controlling for individual worker characteristics, women in
on-call positions earn 20 percent less and those in temp arrangements
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earn 18 percent less in hourly wages than women in regular full-time
employment. The corresponding figures for men are 15 percent lower
in temp employment and 10 percent lower in on-call employment.24
The author finds that after adding controls for job characteristics
(including health and pension coverage), the negative wage effects for
both groups are statistically insignificant. In other words, the job char-
acteristics of on-call and temp arrangements account for virtually all
the pay differential, a result that departs from those obtained in other
research based on earlier surveys. However, a negative hourly pay dif-
ferential—6 percent for women and 8 percent for men—between regu-
lar part-time and regular full-time workers remains (Hudson 1999).
EXPLANATIONS FOR TRENDS
The macroeconomic context of nonstandard employment has
shaped the questions raised by researchers in each country. There is
broad agreement that both regular, long-term relationships and others
are in transition (Cappelli 1999; Freyssinet 1982; Michon 1982; Oster-
man 1999; Piore 1980; Ramaux 1993), and the growth of nonstandard
arrangements is a manifestation of these changes.
Three labor demand factors have shaped the use of nonstandard
work arrangements. First, employment structures within large firms
have changed. Job ladders have become truncated; some jobs, particu-
larly entry-level ones, are severed from internal paths of promotion and
their tasks are designed to be performed by workers on short-term or
contract arrangements. Second, and as a corollary to the first change,
outsourcing and contracting out for specialized skills and products
have increased. Third, primarily in the United States, state and local
governments have contracted out the public service delivery to private
operators.
Labor supply factors shaping nonstandard work can be conceived
in two ways. Workforces with characteristics suited to nonstandard
arrangements are “found” (Piore 1980); for example, employers will
recruit workforces with limited labor market attachment, or restricted
time availability, in short-term arrangements. Alternatively, workforce
preferences for nonstandard arrangements are considered the driving
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force. To determine the relative weight of labor supply and labor
demand factors, one must consider the evidence on both workforce
characteristics and worker preferences. It is also necessary to examine
employer motivations by looking at patterns of use. Finally, informa-
tion on how institutional factors affect both labor demand and supply
rounds out the picture.
To assign relatively less weight to labor supply factors, and corre-
spondingly more weight to labor demand factors, one only need argue
that workers in nonstandard arrangements do not differ from others.
Unobserved differences are considered by some researchers. Reported
preferences—degree of satisfaction with current arrangement or desire
for another arrangement—also help weigh relative effects. Reported
preferences are context dependent, however, given that they are also
shaped by the availability of alternatives and the extent of worker
knowledge about these. This context varies in the two countries.
Fixed-Term and Temporary Work in France and the United States
Workforce Characteristics
The shared pattern of female overrepresentation in fixed-term,
direct hire temporary, and on-call employment, and the contrasting pat-
tern of male overrepresentation in temp employment in France and
female overrepresentation (though declining) in the United States pre-
clude explanations based primarily on labor supply characteristics. In
particular, comparisons point to characteristics of labor demand in the
two countries as the driving factor in the composition of temporary
agency employment. 
Young workers in both countries are more likely than other
employees to choose nonstandard work; the pattern is very marked for
very young workers (under age 25) in France (Houseman 1999; Voisin
1989). Whether these arrangements lead to regular employment is
unclear. In France, young unemployed workers are more likely to leave
unemployment than are older workers, but they are also more likely,
when hired, to be in a nonstandard arrangement (Voisin 1989).25
Worker Preferences
In the French context of high unemployment, temp work is seen as
a means to regular employment. In a 1989 survey commissioned by the
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leading temp business association, approximately three-fourths (73
percent) of people who worked as temps in January 1989 responded
they had taken a temp assignment “in hopes of finding permanent
employment during an assignment” or because they “could not find
anything else” (77 percent). Another 39 percent reported wanting the
work experience. Only 18 percent reported they wanted intermittent
employment (PROMATT 1989).26 A 1980 supplement to Enquête
Emploi found that 60 percent of temp workers declared that they were
looking for stable employment, while 17 percent reported that tempo-
rary work suited them (Huet and Schmitz 1984).
Workers in fixed-term, temporary, and part-time work have com-
paratively high rates of job search, and more frequently report looking
for less precarious employment. A study based on the 1986 Enquête
Emploi finds that 28.2 percent of those in CDDs and 44.8 percent of
those in temp employment were looking for a permanent job, com-
pared with 5.9 percent of those in the total workforce. Rates of job
search are higher for young workers (under age 25); 32 percent of
young workers in CDD and 49 percent of those in temp work reported
looking for a permanent job.27 In 1986, 72 percent of job searchers in
CDDs, 76 percent in temp assignments, and 41 percent of searchers
working part-time reported wanting a “less precarious” job as their rea-
son for job search (Heller 1986, p. 33).
In the United States, a majority of workers in short-term and tem-
porary arrangements also report that they would rather have a regular
full-time job. In 1997, 57.6 percent of female temporary workers and
64.1 percent of male temporary workers reported they would rather
have a full-time job, and 52.6 percent of female and 56 percent of male
on-call workers preferred full-time work (Hudson 1999). About 50 per-
cent of direct hire temporaries reported that they would take a job that
is permanent or lasts more than a year (Houseman 1999).
Part-Time Work in France and the United States
Women and Part-Time Work 
Because part-time work affects primarily women, cross-country
differences in female labor force participation are a logical area to
explore in accounting for different trends. However, differences are
insufficient to account for lower part-time work in France in the 1970s
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and 1980s. Female labor force participation rates were about equal in
the two countries in the mid-1970s, but employed French women
tended to have full-time schedules (OECD 1993). Since then, the
United States has outpaced rates in France so that, by 1998, the average
(all ages) female labor force participation rate was 71 percent in the
United States and 61 percent in France. This difference is owing to
much lower rates for young women (under age 25) and older women
(55+). Prime-age French female labor force participation rates were
about as high as those in the United States (more than 76 percent) dur-
ing the 1990s (OECD 1999). It is during this period that part-time work
increased rapidly in France.
Involuntary Part-Time Work 
Involuntary part-time work is both higher and more divergent by
gender in France than in the United States. In 1997, OECD data show
that involuntary part-time work was a higher share of total part-time
work in France (41.3 percent) than in the United States (7.8 percent)
(OECD 1999).28 The share of involuntary part-time work among total
part-time work was 52.9 percent for men and 38.8 percent for women.
The corresponding numbers for the United States were 7.4 for men and
8 percent for women (OECD 1999, p. 33). Based on U.S. data, invol-
untary part-time work (those reporting being unable to find full-time
work) grew from 3 percent in 1973 to 4 percent in 1989.29 It had
declined to 3 percent by 1997 (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 1999).
Part-Time Work and “Underemployment” in France
Underemployment—those wanting to work more (both available
or searching for another job)—grew during the 1990s in France. The
rate of underemployment in the part-time workforce grew from 3.6
percent in 1990 to 6.2 percent in 1999. Women and young part-time
workers—two groups with high unemployment—are more likely to
report underemployment than other workers. Women’s rates of under-
employment were 7 percent in 1990 and 10.7 percent in 1999. The rate
of underemployment among female single heads of households was 13
percent in 1999. The corresponding numbers for men were 1.1 percent
in 1990 and 2.6 percent in 1999. Underemployment rates for young
workers (ages 15 to 24) were 10 percent in 1990 and 13.9 percent in
1999 (Kontchou and Brunet 2000, Table 5.1). Workers who combine
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part-time and CDD or temporary work are overrepresented in under-
employment relative to the share of other employed workers.30
Employer Motivations
Employers in the two countries share similar motivations for using
nonstandard work arrangements as well as similar institutional factors
that shape employer behavior. They also, however, exhibit differences.
The search for quantitative (workforce composition and volume) and
qualitative (skill content) flexibility motivates U.S. and French
employers, albeit in different ways across industrial sectors, and with
somewhat different results in patterns of use. Institutional factors—the
regulations, rules, and customs that shape internal labor markets and
partially protect workers in regular arrangements from fluctuation—
motivate some use of short-term and temporary work in both countries.
The ability to save on benefits and wages, however, is distinct to the
United States.
Shared Motivations and Production Conditions
During the 1970s, when the growth of fixed-term and temporary
contracts as well as contracting out was first noted in France, research-
ers pointed to increased flux and uncertainty in markets as the source
of changing practices. For example, Germe and Michon (1980) exam-
ined whether nonstandard arrangements in manufacturing were associ-
ated with market conditions, firm size, and employment conditions, but
found no straightforward relationships between patterns of use and
product characteristics, demand uncertainty, or employment fluctua-
tion. Instead, nonstandard arrangements were best understood either as
a tool that allowed firms to avoid work reorganization and a change in
workforce management, or as a tool in implementing new production
and management practices. In other words, nonstandard arrangements
could be put to seemingly contradictory uses and were a polyvalent
tool for workforce management. 
More proximate motivations fell into three categories. The first
entailed the need to achieve qualitative as well as quantitative variability
in labor use. Some firms contracted out for specialized labor while oth-
ers rendered a layer of jobs unstable, thus externalizing labor costs, to
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handle uncertainty. The second category achieved cost savings by
closely adjusting workforce size to balance actual work time and com-
pensated work time (also found by Ramaux 1993). The third motivation
was to intensify workforce discipline, for example, by conveying that
regular jobs were “rationed.” As Michon (1982, p. 94) concluded, “vari-
ability and flexibility are broader requirements than uncertainty . . .
irregular forms of employment are neither the only instrument of flexi-
bility, nor an instrument used to this sole end.”31
Researchers have since placed nonstandard arrangements in the
context of work reorganization within firms. Large manufacturing
firms couple internal flexibility (new scheduling practices, multitask-
ing, broad job definitions) with reliance on subcontracting chains, and
with the systematic use of nonstandard arrangements. Most recently, a
study of 36 automobile manufacturing plants and supplier chains
depicts practices of lean staffing for regular production jobs coupled
with a high and systematic use of temp contracts, as well as CDDs. The
use of these practices ranges from 10 percent of total employment
among automobile manufacturers to 50 percent among first- and sec-
ond-level suppliers. Temporary contracts are used to renew the pool of
potential recruits should regular positions open, with the same screen-
ing criteria and education requirements applied.32 Due to legal restric-
tions on the successive renewal of temporary contracts for the same
worker, auto manufacturers and suppliers in France intersperse tempo-
rary assignments with a lengthy CDD (18 months). Temporary assign-
ments offer certain advantages relative to CDDs. Temporary workers
are not counted in workforce productivity measures, and their relative
cost is lowered owing to volume discounts on the markup obtained
from the agency (Gorgeu and Matthieu 2000).33
Case studies of firms outside of manufacturing have connected the
reorganization of production and changes in employment structures
with the systematic use of CDD and temp contracts, although at levels
not as high. Findings are consistent with those reached by Germe and
Michon (1980), which depict nonstandard work arrangements as a tool
facilitating work reorganization and a change in management practices.
In finance and insurance, the nature and size of markets and the refor-
mulation of market strategies have mattered more than fluctuation and
uncertainty in product demand per se. A study of major banks and
insurance companies conducted in the early 1990s found that these
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large organizations used CDD, temporary contracts, and part-time
arrangements to make the transition to a new workforce composition
that would enable firms to successfully compete in an evolving indus-
try (Carré 1993). Banks and insurance companies used nonstandard
arrangements primarily in low and mid-level job categories to 1) con-
trol the volume of hiring, 2) accelerate flux at the margins of employ-
ment systems that they considered stagnant, and 3) provide leeway to
reconsider and modify the career paths of certain workforce categories.
Changes entailed replacing one workforce (high-seniority clericals per-
forming account or contract administration in central offices) with
another (higher-skilled workers for commercial and customer activi-
ties). The shift was to occur in a national context and industry tradition
of few layoffs, near zero job growth (or even decline), and for jobs that
had not changed sufficiently to attract and retain a workforce with the
desired education levels for the future job structure. Nonstandard
arrangements were used along with early retirement and other job
departure incentives. For example, CDDs were used for extended
screening periods, for the replacement of workers on maternity leave
(to permit job reduction if the job holder did not return), and for main-
taining work productivity while planning for job elimination and rede-
sign. 
A 1993 in-depth case study of 24 French manufacturing and ser-
vice establishments mapped key determinants of the pattern and extent
of CDDs and temporary contracts (Ramaux 1993).34 The first determi-
nant shaping patterns of use was the legal and institutional context (see
section below). Second, the variation in the activities of the establish-
ment, whether seasonal, related to product cycles, or tied to market
uncertainty and business cycles, also shaped patterns of use. Third, the
history of employment structures within firms—whether a mature firm
having restructured and downsized (and weathered recessions) or a
new company increasing regular rolls sparingly—affects the use of
nonstandard work. Both result in lean staffing. Fourth, jobs with low
skill requirements are more amenable to CDD and temporary contracts.
Fifth, organizational characteristics play a role. For example, the per-
centage of user firms is higher among large firms, but the use intensity
is higher among smaller firms (also confirmed in national statistics).
Belonging to a conglomerate affects whether internal mobility is an
alternative, the degree of local control over workforce management,
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and the possibility of negotiating volume discounts on agency fees
with temporary services. Sixth, CDDs and temporary contracts are
used in jobs slated for elimination once a new technological process is
fully installed or to facilitate the installation of new equipment. Sev-
enth, labor relations do not seem to have significant impact on use of
CDDs and temp contracts. Finally, local labor market conditions such
as skill bottlenecks or the market penetration of temp agencies affect
patterns of use (Ramaux 1993).
In the United States, employer surveys also reveal the desire to
achieve control of quantitative and qualitative flexibility in staffing and
other motivations parallel to those identified in France (Conference
Board 1995; Houseman 2001; Kalleberg and Reynolds 2000). Results
from the Upjohn Institute nationally representative survey of employ-
ers underscore that “fluctuations in staffing needs” is the most cited
reason for using temps, on-call workers, and direct hire temporaries
(Houseman 2001).35 These fluctuations include unexpected increases in
business; filling a vacancy until a hiring decision is made; absences or
leaves among regular employees; cyclical fluctuations (for temp use);
or industry-specific fluctuations (particularly when coupled with “just-
in-time” staffing). Houseman (1999) further reports that the degree of
seasonal fluctuation is an important determinant of whether an organi-
zation uses temps, direct hire temporaries, or on-call workers. The use
of nonstandard work arrangements, particularly temporary agency
workers, for screening candidates is cited by 21 percent of firms in the
Upjohn study. Also, Kalleberg and Reynolds (2000) find that smaller
firms tend to use nonstandard work arrangements to obtain special
skills and reduce their administration costs, while larger firms tend to
use them to screen workers. The desire to cut benefit costs is reported
by 12 percent of employers in a survey of large firms (Conference
Board 1995). Another survey of large employers finds that saving on
total labor costs, and health insurance costs in particular, is a frequently
cited reason for their use (Christensen 1995). In the Upjohn study, 59
percent of companies using direct hire temporaries and 73 percent of
those using on-call workers report the hourly wage and benefit cost of
these workers is lower than for regular workers (Houseman 1999).
The use of part-time work in both countries has been associated
with the service sector, particularly those jobs with variation in demand
and extended hours of operation. The increase in the use of part-time
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work in France during the 1980s and 1990s has been primarily related
to the growth of personal services, the expansion of hours of operation
of retail trade and other similar activities, the change in the nature of
food service (fast food chains), and, to a small extent, the development
of nonstandard hour shifts in manufacturing. These changes have taken
place later relative to the United States. Case studies of retail trade
have documented employers’ greater use of part-time work schedules
relative to previous decades (Maruani and Nicole 1989), bringing the
practices of this sector on a par with those of U.S. retailers (Tilly
1996).
Shared Institutional Factors 
Despite rather divergent legal standards, the two countries share a
set of institutional factors affecting regular employment that have a
bearing on employer motivation. Over time, in both countries, regular
employment has assumed features that have rendered some nonstand-
ard arrangements appealing to employers. With the growth of worker
rights in regular employment during the 1970s, CDDs and temporary
contracts grew in appeal to French firms. In 1975, faced with layoffs
prompted by the economic crisis, France established an administrative
oversight of collective and individual layoffs for economic reasons.
Employers were mandated to obtain a preauthorization by Ministry of
Labor inspectors, to provide prior notification to workers36 and sever-
ance pay, as well as to formulate a “social plan” (redeployment,
retraining, job search assistance, early retirement) for review by labor
inspectors and discussion with worker representatives.37 The impact of
the legislation has been much debated. In practice, the mandate
included clauses already in effect in national collective bargaining
agreements in major sectors, and thus did not introduce significant
changes in those sectors. Large firms were more likely to have elabo-
rate oversight procedures than smaller ones. Also, layoffs were most
often approved. However, labor inspectors’ discretion and their ability
to raise questions, require revisions, and introduce lags in the proce-
dure have been seen as having a dampening effect on some layoff deci-
sions and singling out regular employment as a protected arrangement
(Caire and Kerschen 1999, Piore 1980).38
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However, the use of nonstandard contracts has since become wide-
spread and sustained despite the weakening of layoff protections for
workers in regular contracts. For example, the administrative preautho-
rization of layoffs of regular workers was removed in 1986 owing to
employer opposition and implementation difficulties. Prior notification
(with a worker interview), severance pay,39 and the requirement to con-
sult with worker representatives about the social plan and to “present”
the latter to a labor inspector remain following legal changes in 1993
and 1995. Also, disputes arising about the social plan or about the eco-
nomic reasons for an individual layoff are handled through a system of
individual and collective (union, works committee) recourse to the
court system—both peer representation labor courts and courts of
appeal (Caire and Kerschen 1999). Layoff avoidance remains fairly
common in large employers, particularly in white-collar employment.
It is also more common among similar employers in the United States
(compared to manufacturing), although to a lesser degree.
Increasingly, the use of nonstandard work arrangements has been
understood as motivated by a complex set of decisions shaped only in
part by regulations. Employers in 24 firms report a number of costs
related to layoffs that are conducive to their circumscribing regular
employment contracts only to positions unlikely to be cut. These rea-
sons relate only indirectly to the institutional framework. Employers
wish to avoid costs related to prenotification and severance pay as well
as those (staff time) associated with mandates for individual meetings
or consultation with worker representatives. They also aim to avoid
costs related to employee relation problems created by a layoff
(Ramaux 1993).
In the United States, laws and executive orders enforcing equal
employment opportunity by protecting workers from discrimination in
hiring, promotion, and discharge have also entailed some oversight of
employer behavior. Factors that have altered termination costs and pos-
sibly encouraged the use of temporary work, in particular, include
restrictions on the employment-at-will common law standard. Tempo-
rary employment entails no firing costs. Autor (2003) finds that states
that recognized exceptions to the employment-at-will legal standard,
particularly those recognizing “implied contracts,” experienced higher
growth in temporary agency employment between 1979 and 1995.
These exceptions recognize that workers with an implied contractual
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right to continued employment (for example, language in personnel
policies) may successfully challenge a discharge in court. Autor finds
that “implied contracts” led to 14 percent to 22 percent excess tempo-
rary agency employment in adopting states (46 out of 50) compared
with nonadopting states. He concludes that the adoption of exceptions
to the employment-at-will standard explains as much as 20 percent of
the temporary employment growth over the period.40
Differing Institutional Factors 
France has undergone several waves of regulation and deregulation
of nonstandard contracts. Temporary contracts first became subject to
regulation in 1972 and CDDs in 1979. Regulations became more strin-
gent in 1982 and attempted to achieve two things at once: 1) to restrict
the use of fixed-term and temporary contracts to nonpermanent jobs
and, concurrently, 2) to provide guarantees to workers in nonstandard
work arrangements that were equivalent to those for regular workers.
In the end, they partially succeeded on the second goal but not the first.
From 1982 to 1986, regulations explicitly spelled out the economic sit-
uations in which short-term and temporary contracts could be used. In
1986, and later in 1989, the government abandoned this close monitor-
ing. In the environment of virtually stagnant job growth during the
1980s, government policy came to reflect the view that removing barri-
ers to the use of nonstandard work arrangements would facilitate job
creation even if only nonstandard jobs (Carré 1993). Quarterly data on
temporary contract use indicate that the 1982 restrictions indeed had a
dampening effect on temporary agency employment. However, the
temporary agency trend turned up again in 1984. The laws of 1985 and
1986, designed to favor the growth of temporary employment, did not
have a significant impact on this upward trend (Charraud 1993). The
reintroduction of a list of allowed reasons for using CDDs and tempo-
rary contracts in 1990, coupled with penalties, has compelled employ-
ers to monitor the reasons they report to the Labor Ministry but does
not appear to have affected patterns of use. The easing of restrictions
on successive contract renewals seems to have encouraged the longer-
term use of CDDs (Ramaux 1993).
Several key regulations remain that distinguish the situation in
short-term and temporary work in France from that in the United
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States. First, the regulations mandated parity of wages and benefits
between workers in nonstandard work arrangements and those in regu-
lar employment in similar positions, with equivalent skills, and not on
probation. Laws, collective bargaining agreements, and policies (pay,
benefits) that apply to regular workers apply to workers on short-term,
temporary, and part-time contracts. In addition, workers in CDDs and
temporary contracts receive notice of the exact duration of their con-
tract and a lump-sum payment at the end of it. Second, the operations
of temporary agencies are closely regulated. Since 1972, temporary
agencies must purchase a form of insurance that guarantees payment of
back wages and social benefits to workers in case of bankruptcy. The
Ministry of Labor also publishes a list of dangerous activities for which
temporary work is illegal. Marginal temporary agencies have been
weeded out by the inability to sustain higher costs or by penalties (Puel
1989). It is illegal to use workers on temporary contracts (as well as
CDDs) during a labor strike. Also, the government compelled industry-
wide collective bargaining for the temporary agency industry as a
whole as an alternative to regulation. Since 1985, all temp workers are
covered by sectoral collective bargaining agreements that have defined
principles for industry-wide seniority, and established peer-representa-
tion structures to administer benefits such as sick pay, or supplemen-
tary retirement benefits, or the extension of some job-related benefits
beyond the duration of a temporary work assignment. In the 1980s,
these provisions made temp contracts relatively more expensive than
CDDs. The latter were more likely to be used for a large volume of
short-term workers while temporary contracts were used for limited
and very short-term needs. Since 1990, legislation has brought terms of
employment under the two types of contract nearly on a par.41 The
agency markup that makes temporary contracts costlier per hour is
often reduced by large firms, which are able to negotiate a significant
volume discount with temporary agencies (Ramaux 1993).42
Mandated parity of wages and benefits does not wholly eliminate
cost incentives because nonstandard workers, for example, may be in
different jobs than regular workers and do not benefit from seniority-
based wage premiums and other aspects of nonwage compensation
(seniority-based profit sharing, productivity premium). In addition,
employers may alter the notion of “equivalent skills” or assign non-
standard workers to a job while requiring tasks be performed at a
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higher level of skill (Ramaux 1993). Nevertheless, mandated parity
greatly diminishes the incentive to differentiate worker pay levels and
access to benefits, a sharp contrast to the U.S. situation.
The regulation of work hours and hours of operation for retail busi-
nesses has differed significantly over time in the two countries, a situa-
tion that may account for the contrasting part-time trends. French
legislation on work hours was revised in the 1990s, allowing more non-
standard schedules and shift work. In addition, part-time work has been
used as a policy tool, albeit one with multiple, some would even say
contradictory, purposes—flexible work options, unemployment allevi-
ation, easing labor market entry, or contributing to internal flexibility
(Favennec-Henry 1998). Beginning in 1973, it was fostered with
employer incentives to meet worker requests to switch from full-time
to part-time schedules.43 In the 1980s, part-time work was seen as a
means to job creation and the sharing of work. Its use was fostered for
the progressive retirement of high-seniority workers in industries
undergoing restructuring such as banking, insurance, and automotive
industries (Carré 1993). In these industries, high-seniority workers
could convert to part-time at half pay and receive a government sub-
sidy toward their full pay if the company agreed to keep them for two
years. Since the 1980s, mandated social security contributions have
remained “neutral” with regard to work hours, whereas they had previ-
ously penalized part-time work (Marimbert 1992). In the 1990s, to ease
labor market entry and provide employers with flexibility, the govern-
ment facilitated employer use of part-time work. Eligibility for govern-
ment supports was expanded from 19–30 weekly hours to 16–32
weekly hours averaged on a yearly, as well as monthly or weekly,
basis. The count of part-time workers was prorated for all regulations
dependent on workforce levels (e.g., works committee representation),
and employers could introduce part-time schedules without prior con-
sultation with work committees and unions. In addition, employers
benefit from reductions (25 percent in 1992 and 30 percent after 1992)
in their social security (health, pension) tax contribution for creating
new part-time jobs. The reductions correspond to an 18 percent decline
in the wage bill for a given amount of work (Caire and Kerschen 1999). 
In the 1990s, part-time work has also been used to trim costs. It has
become fairly common practice in retail trade to hire some workers on
part-time contracts while also having them work “complementary”
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hours up to an additional 10 percent of their scheduled hours (as high
as 33 percent in 1986). These complementary hours are paid at straight,
rather than at overtime, rates.44 The threshold of allowable complemen-
tary hours is subject to policy change according to the priorities of suc-
cessive governments.
It is difficult to sort out the relative effects of successive policies,
changing employer practices, and the high unemployment context on
part-time trends in the 1980s and 1990s in France. The concentration of
women in part-time employment, coupled with high reports of under-
employment by young women in part-time work, seem to indicate that
newly created part-time positions are behind much of the growth, as
opposed to workers converting full-time schedules to part-time by
choice. As part-time work has grown in France, its gender composition
and occupational distribution have come to resemble that in the United
States, suggesting similarities in patterns of use by firms. The remain-
ing differences are in pay and benefits, suggesting that cost savings
play a part in U.S. employer motivations.
CONCLUSION
Despite rather different policy environments of employment rela-
tions as a whole and for nonstandard work arrangements in particular,
both countries now face policy challenges created by the sustained
presence of nonstandard work arrangements in their economies. First,
in both countries, key social protection programs are tied to employ-
ment experience. For example, the degree to which workers benefit
from unemployment insurance and pension is related to steady
employment. This issue is much more acute in the United States, where
these programs offer less generous benefits and less extensive coverage
for workers in both regular and nonstandard work arrangements. Sec-
ond, the employment regulation problem created by triangular relation-
ships in temporary agency work has been addressed in France with
industry-level agreements (as well as specific regulations) for the temp
industry. It remains an unsolved problem in the United States, however,
although recent court decisions have found an employment “relation-
ship” between the temporary worker and the user firm for representa-
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tion purposes. Because triangular relationships entail a mix of business
contracts (client-intermediary), employment contract (intermediary-
worker), and a supervisory relationship (client-worker) with little legal
definition, they are a challenge for the existing policy apparatus. Both
countries have little experience with regulating business contracts to
protect individual employees and have yet to grapple with the supervi-
sory relationship (Triomphe 1999). Third, in both countries, the issue
of skill maintenance and upgrading for nonstandard workers over the
course of lengthy careers is salient. Neither country has found ways to
substitute for employer-sponsored, on-the-job training and skill
enhancement in the absence of a regular work arrangement and steady
employment.
Notes
Many thanks to Natasha Iskander, Pamela Joshi, Laura O’Neill, Elizabeth Quinn, and
Ilana Brito for excellent research assistance. Thank you to Susan Houseman, Hiromasa
Suzuki, and conference participants for their helpful comments. 
1. For young workers (age 15 to 24), the male unemployment rate was 15 percent in
1990 and 22 percent in 1998.
2. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.
3. INSEE Enquête Emploi is conducted yearly in April–May for 1982, in March for
1983 to 1997, and in January for 1999. Information on “employment status/
arrangements” is available for wage and salary workers, except those employed
by the national and local governments (and those in national military service). All
computations reported here are for “private wage and salary workers.” Starting
with the 1990 survey, one category of workers previously counted in the private
sector, “interns,” is redefined and moved outside of the private sector. It now com-
bines “interns and government subsidized contracts,” a group of arrangements
created to favor access to the labor market for youths; it is in an ambiguous “pub-
lic-private” position. For consistency with prior years, these workers are not
included in the base for total private-sector employment in this chapter. As a
result, the incidence of CDD and temporary workers may be higher beginning in
1990 than in previous years because the base no longer counts “interns”; actually,
incidence for CDDs and temporary workers declined from 1989 to 1990–1991,
making it difficult to discern the impact of this small change in the base number.
Also, beginning in 1995, several broad industry categories are broken down more
finely.
4. The CPS is conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; see Table 5.1. All
employed persons except unpaid family workers are included in the March sup-
plement, and the base for figures is civilian employment.
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5. Based on an employer survey, Houseman (2001) reports an estimate of 3.4 per-
cent for direct hires.
6. Establishment level numbers from the Current Employment Statistics are for SIC
736, Personnel Supply Services, in which over 75 percent of workers are esti-
mated to be in the temp industry (see Carré 1992).
7. Unfortunately, reporting of the incidence of temporary contracts across industrial
sectors of assignment in the national labor force survey was discontinued in 1990.
Workers with temporary contracts were counted as working in market services
from 1990 to 1993, after which they were counted in the subcategory of business
services, where they accounted for 21.3 percent of employment in 1999.
8. In addition to personnel supply services (they report the temporary agency as their
employer), female temporary workers cluster in telephone and communications,
and electrical machinery. Male temp workers cluster in motor vehicles (and equip-
ment) as well as in construction, telephone and communications, and engineering/
architectural and surveying industries, in addition to personnel supply.
9. For black male temporary workers, the most common occupation is assembler
and for Hispanic males it is truck driver.
10. The authors use the establishment file from the UNEDIC, the unemployment
insurance fund run jointly by employer and union representatives. Earlier studies
also confirmed the concentrated use of temporary workers in manufacturing and
construction.
11. The author reports tabulations based on the March Current Population Survey for
1985, 1986, 1995, and 1996 using information on main job in previous year (see
Table 8.3 in Blank 1999).
12. In the United States, a nonnegligible number of survey respondents report that
they are wage and salary workers, which seems to contradict their “independent
contractor” status. In France, private-sector employment excludes government-
sponsored internships. Independent contractors who also include self-employed
business owners account for 9.5 percent of male employment and 5.7 percent of
female employment. The share of “independents” in public and private employ-
ment is 8.6 percent for the total, 7.7 percent for males, and 3.9 percent for females
(INSEE 1999, Table PA05).
13. Broader definitions yield estimates ranging from 0.6 percent to 1.2 percent of
employment (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000; Houseman and Polivka 2000;
Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000).
14. Although different hour thresholds yield significant differences in part-time lev-
els, the relative rankings of countries in terms of the incidence of part-time work
vary little by definition (OECD 1999, p. 22).
15. Between 1987 and 1997, the share of short hours among total part-time hours in
France declined from 37.4 percent to 33.7 percent for males, and from 38.9 per-
cent to 35.5 percent for females. This share declined as well in the United States,
although it remained higher than in France throughout the period; it declined from
45.4 percent to 42.3 percent of total part-time work for males, and from 44.8 per-
cent to 40.8 percent for females.
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16. Definitions of part-time work have changed over time. The Enquête Emploi
reports as part-time workers anyone declaring a part-time job, usually up to 32
weekly hours. For policy purposes, a part-time job is defined as working at least
one-fifth fewer than the statutory, or conventional (bargained), weekly, monthly,
or yearly hours (Caire and Kerschen 1999). Those working between 32 and 40
hours may self-report as full-time or part-time, depending on the prevailing
schedule in their workplace. With the full implementation of the 35-hour work
week, the definition for part-time may change. 
17. The particular subsectors with high incidence are eating and drinking establish-
ments, grocery and department stores, and in colleges and universities.
18. Published data on occupations do not separate wage and salary from independent
workers.
19. The study uses the monthly Déclaration des Mouvements de Main d’Oeuvre and
compiles employer reports on regular contracts and CDDs that have either started
or expired during the survey month. Public administration, local governments,
public health services, and national defense establishments are excluded.
20. The study used a sample of files for those who registered between September and
November 1993 with the unemployment agency, ANPE. A sample of 23,882 reg-
istered unemployed was followed monthly until July 1996.
21. The study includes private wage and salary workers in the Enquête Emploi, hav-
ing participated in all three labor force surveys (1994, 1995, and 1996). As sur-
veys provide retrospective information, the period covered by the study is 1993–
1996. 716,000 reported working in “constrained” part-time work in 1994, and
970,000 reported working in chosen part-time work (Galtier 1999a).
22. Those in short part-time hours (fewer than 15 hours per week) in 1994 were likely
to have been unemployed in 1993. By 1996, those with short part-time hours in
1994 were less likely to work full-time; only 14 percent worked full-time com-
pared with 43 percent of those working in long hours in part-time work (30 or
more weekly hours).
23. They are also more likely to have part-time hours than workers in standard
arrangements. In 1997, 54 percent of on-call workers, and 21 percent of tempo-
rary agency employees worked part-time (Houseman 1999).
24. The hourly wage of independent contractors, however, does not differ markedly
from that of regular full-time workers.
25. In a 1986 sample of the registered unemployed, 58 percent of males under age 25
and 48 percent of females were employed 18 months later. Corresponding figures
for those ages 25–49 were 51 percent and 35 percent, respectively. Of those under
age 25 who had found employment, only 45 percent of males and 33 percent of
females had found a regular job; 23 percent of males and 33 percent of females
had found jobs with a CDD or temporary contract.
26. Of those workers in the survey who were still temps six months later (July)—57
percent of the January sample—most (66 percent) reported they were still temps
because they had not found other employment, and 32 percent reported that tem-
porary employment suited their needs. The survey was conducted in July 1989 by
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Institut Français de l’Opinion Publique (IFOP) for PROMATT and included a rep-
resentative sample of 1,000 persons who were temporary workers in January
1989.
27. Job search to find a standard arrangement is also higher for part-time workers
with fewer than 30 hours per week; their rate is twice as high as that for the total
workforce and six times as high in the case of young women in short part-time
hours.
28. The numbers for France exclude the self-employed and family workers. The defi-
nition for involuntary part-time is “workers who say they are working [part-time]
because they could not find [full-time] work” (OECD 1999, p. 33).
29. Tilly (1992) reports that two-thirds of the growth of total part-time work between
1969 and 1988 was accounted for by the growth of involuntary part-time work.
30. In 1999, workers on CDDs accounted for 12.4 percent of the underemployed
compared with 3.4 percent of other workers (public and private sectors com-
bined); 14 percent of underemployed women worked under CDDs compared with
4 percent of other workers. Workers in temporary assignments represent 2.3 per-
cent of the underemployed compared with 1.9 percent of the total employed
(Kontchou and Brunet 2000, Table 3). Study based on Enquête Emploi, 1990–
1999. Differences noted are significant; logit model controlled for sex, age,
diploma, nationality, and broad region of residence.
31. Translation by author.
32. Sometimes the auto plant selects the workers and sends them to the temporary ser-
vice for processing. Tests used for all production workers are administered during
the first three-month temp assignment, which is renewed if the tests are passed.
33. The two main auto manufacturers are experimenting with a partnership with temp
companies to generate an industry-wide pool of temp workers trained within auto
plants and whose skills are “vetted” by the industry so they can readily shuttle
among plants.
34. The establishments include 14 from manufacturing, two in construction and pub-
lic works, and eight in service-producing activities (e.g., FIRE, and services
proper).
35. This section relies extensively on Houseman 1999.
36. One month for those with at least six months seniority and two months for those
with more than two years of seniority.
37. The procedure created an opening for forging public-private agreements to draw
on government aid to dislocated workers.
38. The legislation provided additional grounds for clerical and professional workers,
categories of workers previously immune from layoffs, to challenge their layoffs
due to restructuring in peer representation labor courts, an action which many
took. Labor courts thus became backlogged. In construction, with its frequently
recurrent layoffs, the legislation prompted the rapid adoption of temporary con-
tracts simply to avoid the oversight and the lags it entailed.
39. This amounts to about 17 weeks of pay (Caire and Kerschen 1999, p. 309).
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40. States in which union density declined less slowly (unions were stronger) had
more rapid temporary agency employment growth than those with rapidly declin-
ing union density (Autor 2003). In contrast, earlier research on temporary agency
trends (1982–1988) concluded that the decline in union power enabled firms to
increase their use of temporary workers (Golden and Appelbaum 1992).
41. For example, the lump sum payment is set at 10 percent of total compensation for
temps and 6 percent for CDDs.
42. Although the average factor is estimated to be 2.2 in 1993 for the entire temp
industry (i.e., for an hourly pay of 100, the temp cost is 220), some large employ-
ers were able to negotiate it down to 2.05 or lower (Ramaux 1993, p. 95).
43. One principle remains from this era. Within a workplace, those working part-time
and preferring full-time work, and those working full-time but preferring part-
time have priority in bidding for jobs with equivalent skill levels to their own.
44. This practice was facilitated by 1986 legislation that revoked a 1982 provision
mandating the conversion of part-time contracts to full-time contracts when the
worker had effectively worked full-time for a period of 12 weeks.
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